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LACHES OF STOCKHOLDERS SUING ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION.
The case of Pollitz v. the Wabash Railroad Co., et al., Ioo N. E.,
721, decided in the New York Court of Appeals last December,
involves an interesting point as to the doctrine of laches. The
facts, sufficient for the purposes of this discussion are these: Five-
directors of the Wabash Railroad Co. about August, 19o4, con,
summated an agreement, the effect of which was to place in their
hands stock of the Wabash Company to the amount, par value, of
$Io,ooo,ooo, In June, 19o6, James Pollitz, plaintiff in this action,
became a stockholder in the company. In December, i9o9, his
request to the company to institute this action was refused. He
thereupon brought suit for damages against the company and the
five directors, alleging that the securities received by the company
in consideration for the stock were absolutely worthless, that the
transaction was fraudulent and had resulted in damage to the
company to the extent of $Io,ooo,ooo. The prayer of the bill
was that the company have judgment against the individual de-
fendants for $Io,ooo,ooo with interest, and that they be compelled
to account to the company for their official conduct as officers or
directors during the period, and pay to the company the loss it
sustained as the result of the wrongful and illegal transactions set
forth.
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It is important to note here that this is not an action to set
aside the sale of the stock, but an action to recover damages re-
sulting from the sale.
One of the defenses set up was that the laches of the plaintiff
had barred him from getting relief, which defense was demurred
to upon the ground, in the words of the Code of Civil Procedure
of New York, "that it was not sufficient in law upon the face
thereof". The Court of Appeals, standing four to three, held that
such defense was sufficiently pleaded. The argument of the
majority was that "knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of the
essential facts constituting the alleged wrong, the opportunity for
seeking and enforcing the remedy, and prolonged delay in doing
so are shown." The argument of the minority, speaking through
Cullen, C. J., was, "The claim for damages can be barred only by
the same statute of limitations that would bar an action by the
company for the same relief. . . . as long as the legal right exists,
the party is entitled to maintain his action in equity."
The doctrine of laches is an equitable doctrine, growing out of
the maxim, vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit. The
fundamental proposition of justice behind that maxim is the same as
that which gave rise to the statutes of limitation governing actions
at law. The purpose sought to be accomplished by the doctrine
of laches is exactly the same as that accomplished by the statutes
of limitation. The difference between the methods of applying
the two is the natural result of the difference between equitable
and legal remedies. It is quite proper, because of the inherent
nature of that kind of relief which Courts of Law grant, to say,
that a party shall have relief provided it is asked for within a cer-
tain stated time. On the other hand, the nature of equitable relief,
such as the granting of specific performance, injunctions, bill quia
timet, etc., makes it necessary in such cases to consider, more
especially than at law, the peculiar circumstances of each case, and
to require of a suitor greater merit on his part to entitle him to
that higher order of relief which he seeks. In some cases dili-
gence is a most important part of that merit, and to such par-
ticularly does the doctrine of laches apply.
But when that kind of relief known to us as legal, is sought, for
reasons of jurisdiction in a Court of, Equity, the Court should
look for guidance, not to the principles and rules that govern the
administration of equitable remedies, but to those which govern
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the kind of relief that is asked for, that is legal relief. The doc-
trine of laches was not designed to reach cases of this nature, and
the statutes of limitation were.
In the principal case the plaintiff is asking that a legal remedy
be granted to the company, who is entitled to it; but who cannot
obtain it at law because the legal representatives of the company
refuse to ask for it. The jurisdictional reason that brings the
plaintiff into equity has nothing to do with the nature of the
remedy that he seeks, and it should not subject him to the opera-
tion of rules which do not apply to that kind of remedy. Thus
the matter appears upon principle and we find good authority in
support thereof.
Plumer, Master of the Rolls, in Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2
Mer., 173, at page 357, says, "that whenever a bar has been fixed
by statute to the legal remedy in a Court of Law, the remedy in a
Court of Equity has, in the analogous cases, been confined to the
same period." See also the opinion of Lord Eldon, Chancellor,
upon appeal in the House of Lords. 4 Bli., i. This languagie
looks to the nature, whether legal or equitable, of the remedy
sought.
That a stockholder fraudulently induced to purchase shares in a
company must not be guilty of laches in suing the company to set
aside the purchase (equitable relief), but that this rule does not
seem to apply to a suit against the fraudulent directors themselves
for damages (legal relief), see the following cases:
Buirgess' Case, L. R., 15 Ch. Div., 507; Oakes v. Turquand,
L. R., 2 H. L., 325; Stone v. City and Co. Bank, L. R., 3 C. P.
Div., 282; Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank, L. R., 5 App.
C., 317, 323; Tennant v. City of Glasgow Bank, L. R., 4 App. C.,
615, 621; Kent v. Freehold Co., L. R., 3 Ch., 493; In re London,
etc., Bank, L. R., 12 Eq., 331; In re Overend, etc. Co., L. R., 3 Eq.,
-576.
That laches acts only under peculiar circumstances where dili-
gence is an important part of that merit which must be shown to
entitle the plaintiff to equitable relief, see the able opinion of Lord
Cottenham in Duke of Leeds v. Amherst, 2 Phil., 117, 123.
A doctrine very forcibly announced by Lord Redesdale in
Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef., 63o , is that although Courts
of equity are not within the words of the statutes of limitation,.
they are within their spirit and meaning, and act as to legal titles
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and demands, not by analogy, but in obedience to them. See also
upon this point, Ferson v. Sanger, 8 Fed. Cases, 4752; Foley v.
Hill, i9 Eng. Ch., 399; affirmed in the House of Lords, 2 H. L.
Cas., 28. This language might be well otherwise worded to the
effect that the granting of legal relief, whether in a Court of Law
or of Equity, must be done according to the rules applicable to
the nature of the relief sought.
In the case of Galway v. the Metropolitan Elevated Railway
Co., 128 N. Y., 132, at page 146, Chief Justice Ruger says, "Inas-
much as the equitable remedy depends, among other things, upon
the existence of a legal cause of action, it follows that those facts
which will bar the legal action will also afford an answer to the
equitable remedy, and that so long as a legal remedy exists an
Equity Court is open to aid in the enforcement of the legal claim."
All the justices concurred in this opinion.
We conclude that the doctrine of laches does not apply to those
cases wherein relief of a legal nature is songht, such relief being
barred-only by the statute of limitations, and we find ourselves in
complete agreement with Chief justice Cullen, in his dissenting
opinion concurred in by Vann and Willard Bartlett, J. J.
EFFECT IN A BURGLARY INSURANCE POLICY OF STIPULATIONS
AGAINST LOSS WHERE THERE ARE NO VISIBLE MARKS OF
FORCE OR VIOLENCE ON THE PREMISES.
In the case of Rosenthal v. American Bonding Co., ioo N. E.,
716 (N. Y.), the plaintiff took out a policy of insurance with the
defendant company, whereby the latter agreed to indemnify him
against loss occasioned by burglary, where the burglar entering
or leaving the premises had used force or violence, it being fur-
ther conditioned that there must be visible marks of such force or
violence on the premises. Thieves gained entrance through an
unlocked door, assaulted the clerks of the plaintiff, robbed the
store, and left the premises by the same means through which
they had effected their entry. Recovery was denied on the
grounds that there was no visible marks of force on the premises.
It would seem that where a contract is couched in such un-
equivocal terms as is that which is under consideration in the prin-
cipal case, there could be no room for doubt as to its import.
That such is not the fact, however, readily appears from an ex-
amination of the cases, and from the fact that the decision in the
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principal case reverses with two dissenting votes the holding of
the lowet Court, which has been cited for the past three years as
authority to the contrary; 38 C2c., 276. It seems to be conceded
in the principal case that there was such a forcible entering as to
bring the crime within the definition of burglary. The case is
made to turn upon the particular kind of burglary committed, the
Court being led to view the case in this light by reason of the
phrase in the policy limiting liability to burglary of which there is
some visible mark of violence on the premises. Thus the case
resolves itself into a consideration of the intention of the parties
in inserting the words of limitation into the contract.
Practically all of the cases which have any bearing upon the
point have been decided contrary to the principal case. This
may be accounted for in two ways: (i) the reluctance of Courts
generally to decide in favor of one who has dictated the terms of
a contract when the words that he has employed are susceptible
of two interpretations; Schunmaker v. Great Eastern C. & I.
Co., 197 N. Y., 58: (2) the tendency to regard similar phrases
merely as rules of evidence to protect the insurer against fraud,
and not as conditions limiting liability where proof is absolute and
conclusive; Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U. S., ioo.
The reason and justice of the first point indicated are too obvious
to require special discussion. The second is not so apparent.
From the earliest days of accident insurance there have been
stipulations that the insurer shall not be liable unless there be out-
ward and visible marks of the injury on the body, "the body itself
in case of death not being deemed such mark." And yet, in
practically every case, recovery has been allowed where death has
occurred from accident, whether there was any visible mark at
all, or whether the only visible mark was a change in the com-
plexion of the corpse, due proof that the injury did result from
accident being substantiated by other evidence; Horsfall v. Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 32 Wash., 132. This case is repre-
sentative of the line of authority followed by the lower Court in
deciding the principal case. And while the stipulations of the
policies in those cases are analogous to those under consideration
here, the Court refuses to apply them.
Is it reasonable then, to hold the insured to the literal meaning
of the words employed? In spite of the definiteness with which
it is stated that there shall be no liability unless there be visible
marks of external violence, is it not fair to assume that nothing
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more limiting on the insurer's liability was intended than past
judicial interpretation has given to the words? Although the
opinion discredits the contention that there could have been any
uncertainty as to the intention of the parties in employing the
terms used, it is submitted that when Courts for the past fifty
years have given express words a particular meaning, those same
words employed under similar circumstances in another case
should be given the same meaning.
Certainly the primary object in taking out a policy of this sort
is to secure to the insured protection against theft. If it is
against a particular kind of theft, viz., that in which the burglar
favors the insured by leaving the mark of his jimmy on the win-
dow sill or door jam, the Court is right in its holding. But it is
submitted that were such the real nature of the policy, it would
have but little raison d'etre, for what manner of man in full pos-
session of his reasoning faculties would protect himself with such
a policy at a time when burglary as a fine art has displaced the old
time blunderbuss methods of operation? Such a policy offers
immunity only against the clumsy amateur burglar, unskilled in
the ways of the craft, against whom protection is seldom needed
in a well ordered community, while as against his more skillful
competitor, the cracksman who leaves behind him no mark of
force or violence, the policyholder is without protection. Surely
it could never have been the intention of the insured to enter into
such an agreement.
Looking at the matter from the insurer's point of view we are
forced to the same conclusion. The primary object of a cor-
poration in conducting such a business is to sell as many policies
as possible in order to realize on the premiums an amount above
the losses sustained by reason of the indemnities. Offering such
a policy as the Court would have us believe this to be, just how
many policies would a company be able to dispose of?
Interpreting the contract in the light of former decisions, and
with strict regard for the considerations which must have in-
fluenced the minds of the parties contracting, it is submitted that
the words as used in the policy were intended only for protection
against fraud in cases where other evidence of the breaking and
entering was lacking. They were not intended to limit recovery
to a particular kind of burglary, and the Court in deciding the
principal case takes a most unique position which it is rather hard
to justify or to reconcile with the law as it stands to-day.
